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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM PARLEY SPRATLING 
and DAISY SPRATLING, 
Plaintiffs, Respondents, 
-vs.-
STATE OF UTAH, by and through ) 
its LAND BOARD, 
Defendant, Appellant. 
Case 
No.10947 
BRIEF O,F RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action hy which plaintiffs-respondents 
~e0k to establish their fee simple title to a tract of land 
(hen' in eallecl the "Tract") acquired by their predeces-
sors in interest from the State of Utah under the terms 
of n H>07 Agreement to Purchase Selected Lands. The 
dc·fondm1t-appella11t claims to have reserved mineral in-
h•n•,;ts hy \·irtue of 1919 legislation which is no-w Section 
fi.-l-1-13, UCA 1953. 
1 
STATE,\IENT OF FACTS 
For ma11y years after statehood ·was attained, it wa~ 
the practice of the State's Laml Commissio11en; to per-
mit the public, in effect, to decide what tracts of the fed-
eral public domain should be acquired for the state '8 
lieu selection rights. Any eligible person who wa11tecl 
to acquire federal public domain without the effort of 
homestead entry would simply petition the state to 
select it. To assure that the selection ·would pro(lnce 
immediate revenue, the State required that the per-
son requesting the selection firmly l1incl himself to 
purchase the selected land if the selection were i11 fact 
approved hy the Department of the Interior. In general, 
purchasers acted with confidence because the Depart-
ment coukl deny selection applications only if the laml 
was known to be mineral in character or had been sub-
jected to some prior appropriation under tlw federal 
land laws, and the status and character of public lands 
·were determinable, in the main, from public records. 
In 1907, plaintiff-respondents' predecessors in inter-
<'st undertook to acquire the Tract, requested its selec-
tion, and signed the agreement to pnrehase of which a 
copy is found at pages 13 arnl 14 of the reeonl 11erein. 
~election application was macle by the State that year, 
the selection was eventually eonsummated, and defend-
ant-appellant issued its patent 011 .July 26, 1920, resen'-
i1w no interest or estate of any kind. ~ . 
After the execution of the agrc•ement to purchase 
and hefore the issuance of pat0nt, the 1919 Utah Le~is-
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lature enacted statutes which reserved ''coal and other 
mineral deposited in lands belonging to the state." It 
further required such reservation as to selection appli-
cations then:after approved. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FIND-
ING THE MINERAL ESTATE NOT TO HAVE 
BFJEN RESERVED BY DEFENDANT-RE-
SPONDENT. 
~ NEITHER THE CONDUCT OF THE 
P ARr:L'IES NOR THE LANGUAGE OF 
THEIR AGREEMENT SHOvVED ANY IN-
TENT THAT THE :MINERAL ESTATE BE 
RESERVED. 
The intent of the parties to any agreement must be 
<leterminecl by the language they employed when they re-
duced that agreement to ·writing and, when there is am-
liiguity in that language, by appropriate parol evidence. 
f ll this co1mection, no evidence is more appropriate than 
!he subsequent conduct of the parties in performing and 
implementing their agreement where that conduct shows 
that ('ach party places the same interpretation 011 the 
ambiguous 'rnrcls. 
Drfrnc1ant-appellant lays great stress on lm1guage of 
!lie 1907 Agreement, quoted in its brief, to the effect 
tliat, after the sPlected lands are patented to the State 
Ji~· thP U11itecl States, the "affiant will purchase the land" 
... ''in accordance ·with the provisions of the law gov-
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crning land sales.'' Defendant-respondent construes 
that language to mean that the laws in accordance wit!1 
which the sale is agreed to be made are whatever laws 
are in effect at the time of patent to the State. The quot-
ed language is, of course, even more susceptible to the 
interpretation that the "laws" in contemplation were 
the laws in effect at the time of the agreement. (i.e. afti-
ant icill buy in accordance with the present laws). In 
general, as the editors of Corpus Juris Secundum state 
at 17 A CJS 295, "the law applicable" to a contract "at 
the time and place of its making" (our emphasis) is a 
part of the contract. There is some authority for tlit1 
proposition that parties cannot be implied to have coll-
tracted with reference to future statutes (LoclJ v. Chris-
tie Hotel Corp., 60 P2d 529, 16 C.A. 299) an<l that suhRc-
quently enacted statutes may not be deemed to han heen 
in contemplation in the absence of a clear statement of 
such intent (Drane v. La.ioto11 Co., 141 NE 2d 233). A 
clear statement of such i11tent would employ some sncli 
l'erbiage as '' ... the laws governing land sales in effect 
on the date of conveyance to the State." 
Even if defendant-appellant's construction of the 
language of the contract is reasonable (which ·we do 110t 
concede), there is at least some ambiguity in it. If we 
rPsort to the sub~.equent conduct of the parties for en-
lightenment as to their intent, vve discover that the State 
procee>ded immediately after receipt of the• LT. S. patent 
with the preparation of two documents, first a certificate 
of sale and later a patent, Heither of which reserves mi11-
erals or mentions the possibility of reservation. rrhc 
administrators at the time knew what the rontract meant; 
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it is a half-century later that successor administrators 
attempt to read some different meaning into a contract 
which the negotiators and signers have fully performed 
in acconlance \Yith their intent. 
B. THE STATUTE ON WHICH DEFEND-
ANT-APPELLANT RELIES IS NOT EVEN 
APPLICABLE TO THE TRANSACTION 
UNDER SCRUTINY. 
Defendant-.. A.ppellant relies on Section 65-1-15 
F.C."'"L~. 1953, as the basis for the reservation it asserts. 
That section does not even purport to relate to lands to 
lie aeqnired by the State, it app1ies only to lands "be-
longing to the State" at the time of the enactment. It 
should he remembered that the enabling act grant of 
sr:hool sections was, in terms, in fee and in praesenti. 
'rhere was every reason for concern that valuable min-
rral ii1terests might be alienated in state lands to which 
title had vested. There was much less reason for con-
eern about loss of valuable minerals in lands which might 
latrr lw acquired by selection because applicatio11 for se-
ler·fiou would not even be considered by the United States 
11·ifl101d proof the land was not mineral in character. (See 
affidavit incorporated in Agreement to Purchase Selected 
Lands, Record 14). 
}J l'Vertheless, having first, by Section 65-1-15, solved 
thr ~tate 's problem with reference to "lands belonging 
1o the State of Utah," the 1919 Legislature proceeded 
to deal with the issue of mineral reservation eel non in 
respect to f ecleral public domain the State might later 
a('quire. Defern1ant-appellant argues that the Legisla-
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ture may, in the 0xercise of the police> power, simply co11 
fiscafo the property of its citizens and void the State•\ 
contrnctnal obligations. If so, it is almnclantl~- clc>ar that 
the 1010 Legislature did not have any such totalitarian 
project in mind. By Section 6:>-1-16, UCA 1953, the Leg-
islature provi<1ecl that "all applications to pnrcha~e, 
approred s11bscq11e11t to May 12, 191.9, shall be snhject to 
n reservation'' (our emphasis) of minerals. DPfrrnla11t-
appe!lant can hardly contend that the emphasized lan-
guage was frivolous and that the real intent was to makt' 
applications approved befnre ::\[a~- 12, 101!1, snhjcct tr1 
Uw reser\'a ti on a.c; well. 
The Agreement To Pnrehase Select0<l Lands (Rre-
Ol'll 13) is the application to \diiC'h the str:tnte refers. Thl' 
document's first paragTaph reciks that th0 affiant 
"makes application ... for selection." Tlw application 
in this case was "filed" (as appears at page 14 of thr 
Record) 011 A ugnst 8, 1907, and "appro,-ecl" on the 
same date. It is simply not in the category of applica-
tions to which the Legislatnn• macle the mineral resena-
tion applicable. 
C. THE rt'RIAL COURT DID NOT HOLD 
THAT THFJ STATg COULD NOT, IN PROP-
F:R EXF~RCISE OF THE POLICE PO-WER, 
ABROGATFJ THFJ STATE'S CONrt'RACTS 
- EVJ•:K IP SUCH HOLDI~G \YOPLD 
HAVJ<J BEEN ERROR. 
In argui11g that the State can abrogate its co11tracts, 
Defendant-Appellant makes some' assertions about the 
instant agreement whieh will not stand serntiny. First, 
s<:vs defr])(lallt, the AgreemP11t To Purdiase f4eleetrt1 
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]Jaucls is not a contraet, it is merely an offer to purchase. 
Kxamiuation of the instrument, howeYer, compels the 
conclusion that it is more tha11 offer 'd1ich the state can 
accept or reject after U. S. Patent issues. It firmly hinds 
the State to sell arnl the applicant to bny if the selec-
tion is rornmmmatetl. Paragraph 3 states conditions 
under "·hich the State "shall he released from all obli-
gations u11ckr this agreement." It seems peculiar in-
1lcc(l for the State to specify the conditions under which 
it will be released from obligations if it has none. 
Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55, 61 Pac. 534, is cited by 
ilcfenclant as authority for its assertion that the con-
tract i11itiated no rights. The most cursory reading of 
the case reveals that the applicant there had entered into 
,;neh cu11t met as the one Lefore the Court now. In that 
('asc, the applicant "<lemarnlecl" that the State select 
and sell him land, contending a statute conferred upon 
!1im the right to make such clernand. It was later that 
the State adopted the procedure for realizing revenue 
from its selection rights which i1wolY0d the form of 
n~rcement before ns. 
There have heen volumes writ ten about the nature of 
the police power and the circumstances under which it 
~m1 ])e properly exercised. No case cite<l by clefendant-
nppellant, howeYer, supports the contention that a stat-
ute should he contorferl to effect the abrogatio11 of the 
:-:tnk 's contracts. In the instant case, the statutes care-
fully <liffereutiate between applications filed and ap-
prond lJpforc }fay 12, 1919, ancl applications filed there-
::ftPr. ,\s to the latter category, the Legislature de-
('l'l1ecl that lauds in Yoked should be com·eyccl only sub-
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ject to mineral rese1Tation. Where the agreement Jlr~­
dated the legislatioll, it is evident there was 110 legisla-
ti,·e intent to abrogate or interfere with the obligations 
of the contract. 
The trial court had 110 reason to hohl the State could 
not intcrf ere with contracts, the trial court merely held 
that, in this case, the Legislature did not intend to do 80. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-Respondents' predecessors entered into au 
agreemrnt in 1907 ·which, by its terms, bound the parties 
to a sale on fully specified terms. There is nothing about 
the language of the agr00me11t which suggests the~- co11-
tracted with refrrence tu statutes yet to he enactcrl. 
Even if that interpretatio11 is possible withi11 reason, 
the partirs later fully executed tlwir agrecm0nt in a man-
ner which demonstrates their mutual conviction that the 
1919 statutes did not affect th0ir contract. 
Whether or not the Hl19 L0gi~-;laturc could ha,-e ab-
rogated this contract, the ,,-ords of the statutes confirm 
that there was no legislative intent to do so. The Leg-
islature took pains to protect the rights of applicants 
who had entered into agreements before l\fay 12, 1919. 
rrhe ruling of the trial court should lw upheld. 
Rcspeetfully submitted, 
FRAXK .T. ALLEN, 
CLYDliJ, ::\IECHA::\f & PRATrr 
;331 South State Street 
Salt Lake Cih', Utnh 84111 
Attornry'.<; fnr Res1J01ulP11fs 
